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 Toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt was being led by Mehmed Ali, a 
reformer eager to build his own dynastic state separate from the Ottoman Empire.  Despite his 
achievements, by the end of the nineteenth century Egypt had been occupied by Great Britain for 
nearly two decades.  This paper will examine the developments in Egypt and Great Britain that 
drew the two together, with particular emphasis on the growth and expansion of international 
finance into foreign government lending.  As finance became an increasingly profitable career in 
Britain, financiers entered the gentlemanly class and socialized with the political elite.  
Government policy subsequently reflected the aims of both the political and financial elite under 
a newly defined national interest.  As the national interest was threatened—by financial crisis in 
Egypt and geopolitical threats in Europe—Britain was drawn into more direct involvement with 
the purchase of Khedive Ismail’s Suez Canal Company Shares under Prime Minister Disraeli and 
the invasion and occupation of Egypt under Prime Minister Gladstone, who were both linked 
with financiers and members of the gentlemanly class.  Originally intended to be temporary, the 
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The nineteenth century was a period of dynamic and dramatic change in Egypt.  The turn 
of the century saw Ottoman removal of Napoleon’s forces with assistance from Great Britain.  
By the end of the century, Egypt had been occupied by Great Britain for almost two decades.  In 
the interim, a dynasty begun by an Albanian-Ottoman administrator carved an autonomous 
province out of the Ottoman Empire, attempted to establish its own empire in the Nile Valley 
and the Levant, and developed the institutional and economic foundations of a modern state.  In a 
century filled with such dramatic political shifts, social changes were no less important.
1
  This 
study, however, is primarily interested in the economic conditions of the Egyptian state, the 
penetration of European capital, and the relationship between finance and imperialism.  
 Although Mehmed Ali and his dynasty achieved considerable autonomy for Egypt, the 
territory was still nominally an Ottoman province.  The history of Egypt in the nineteenth 
century is therefore linked to the history of the Ottoman Empire as a whole; yet changes in 
Egypt’s social and economic fabric led to different outcomes.  There are similarities that stand 
out when the two are examined together: both Cairo and the Porte pursued economic and 
political reform in attempts to consolidate power; both utilized foreign loans to finance 
development projects; and both accrued massive foreign debt that prompted foreign 
intervention.
2
   These general similarities should not be taken as evidence that the experiences of 
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both were identical.  Nevertheless, encroaching European financial penetration was, in both 
cases, a forerunner for more direct forms of intervention, albeit manifesting in different ways.    
 European intervention in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt occurred in response to state 
bankruptcies during the 1870s brought on by a combination of ineffective financial 
administration, a worldwide collapse in commodity prices, and predatory lending by European 
financiers.  Moreover, both bankruptcies led to bondholder intervention in government affairs.  
Yet Egypt would lose control over its own affairs, becoming a “veiled protectorate” of the 
British Empire, while the Ottoman Empire was still an independent entity and experienced 
relatively minor intervention from the European powers in the form of the Ottoman Public Debt 
Administration.  Was international bondholder intervention in Egypt ineffective enough to 
prompt Britain into unilateral action?  Why did the British government decide that Egypt was 
worthy of direct intervention while the Ottoman Empire merely needed financial guidance?  
Why did Great Britain have an interest in Egypt in ways different from the Ottoman Empire as a 
whole? 
 For Great Britain, the most important consideration in the second half of the nineteenth 
century was the Eastern Question, or how to approach the threat posed by simultaneous Russian 
expansion and Ottoman contraction in the Balkans and Asia.  Although Great Britain had sought 
to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the face of Russian expansion throughout the 
nineteenth century,
3
 the British government seized control of one of the Porte’s nominal 
provinces and finished the process of amputation begun by Mehmed Ali.  Britain’s invasion and 
occupation of Egypt beginning in 1882 has most often been explained as a measure protecting 
the Suez Canal, the waterway opened only thirteen years before and the quickest route from 
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  Others have ascribed the British occupation to official action by the 
government on behalf of the bondholders of Egyptian debt.
5
  As is often the case, the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle. 
 A recent attempt at finding a middle ground between the various theories of imperialism 
identifies a class of gentlemanly capitalists, particularly financiers involved in government loans 
and likeminded government officials, as the progenitors and agents of British imperialism.
6
  
Their preference for foreign government bonds over commercial and industrial interests meant 
that returns on investment were the focus, not development.  Rather than identifying the concern 
for imperial security or financial solvency in isolation from one another, this theory explains 
imperial action as a result of the confluence of the elite constituencies in contemporary British 
policy.  Applied to Egypt, the theory is successful in showing that one does not need to give 
precedence to either strategic or financial goals since the two are completely entwined.  The 
British government’s purchase of Khedive Ismail’s shares of the Suez Canal Company is an 
informative representation of gentlemanly capitalism at work.  The Suez Canal was undoubtedly 
a strategic and economic asset to Great Britain as a means of protecting and trading with India; 
by purchasing the Khedive’s shares, Britain had gained a financial asset (and potential liability) 
as well.   
 In simple terms, this theory of imperialism describes a “gentlemanly elite who promoted 
and served capitalist interests” both at home and abroad.
7
  Who comprised the gentlemanly elite 
and were they active in Egypt?  What is the precipitate combination of interest and action by 
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financiers, merchants, manufacturers, and politicians in British imperialism in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century?  In order to answer these questions, the next section will provide a brief 
historical survey of the development and expansion of British industry and overseas commerce 
and finance in Ottoman domains.  This section will also examine the changing social fabric of 
Great Britain in the nineteenth century which allowed for a new class of gentlemen to emerge 
before turning to specific examples of gentlemanly capitalists. 
 After examining developments in Great Britain, economic and political developments in 
Egypt during the nineteenth century will be analyzed.  Particular focus will be placed on the 
development of a state monopoly system for funding state-building projects and the dismantling 
of that system within several decades.  Why did the state monopoly system fail?  Who benefitted 
from liberalized trade in Egypt?  What unforeseen consequences did trade liberalization have for 
the Egyptian state?  As noted above, Egyptian financial insolvency occurred at the same time as 
Ottoman bankruptcy and therefore some comparisons must be made between the two cases.   
 The final section will examine the rapid changes in Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1875-
1885.  Over the course of this decade Egypt lost its stake in the Suez Canal Company, lost 
control of its finances, and, ultimately, lost its autonomy.  Meanwhile, the British government 
purchased a stake in a private company to whose founding it had originally been opposed, 
pressured the Porte to depose the sometimes rigid Khedive Ismail, and, eventually, invaded and 
occupied Egypt.  Herein lies the main question: why did Great Britain invade and occupy Egypt?  
Instead of relying on a single primary motive—whether financial, commercial, or strategic—this 
analysis will show that these motives were interrelated and formed an interest that originated 
with and was advanced by gentlemanly capitalists in Great Britain, before finally being 
institutionalized by their contemporary elites in politics and the state bureaucracy.  The 
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occupation of Egypt is only one manifestation of this interest; international cooperation in the 
Ottoman PDA was another.  Although the British imperial ruling castes were not identical in 
social or occupational character, finance capitalism was a unifying interest out of which late 
nineteenth century imperialism grew.  Foreign policy in general and the occupation in particular 
were not motivated by a desire to protect bondholder interests; however, bondholder interests 




















Chapter 1 - The 19
th
 Century: Empire, Free Trade, and Finance 
 
 Nineteenth century Britain, like contemporary Egypt, underwent extensive political, 
economic, and social change.  Of particular interest to this study is the way in which a dynamic 
economic system affected change in the social and political life in Great Britain and how those 
changes manifested themselves in state policy.  The rise of a new financial and political order 
was accompanied by an alignment of financial and political interests into one national interest as 
defined by gentlemanly capitalists.  This alignment is evidenced by the state’s responses to 
domestic economic crises and its diplomacy, particularly in regions outside of direct British 
control.    
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 ushered in a new financial system in which the 
government could accumulate debt in large amounts.
8
  The somewhat easy and reliable flow of 
capital to the state was encouraged by landowners’—and later, bankers’—investments in 
government debt, which gave them a financial stake in the well-being of the political system.  
The potential for these moneyed men to corrupt politics in pursuit of their own interest was 
something to which seventeenth and eighteenth century commentators alluded frequently.  
According to Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, “great companies [were] created, the 
pretended servants, but in many respects the real masters of every administration.”
9
   While there 
may have been some truth to that statement around the turn of the eighteenth century, 
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corporations like the East India Company and the Bank of England were discredited as 
bondholders by the time Bolingbroke was writing.
10
   
 In the early nineteenth century, financiers were busy investing in railways and issuing 
foreign loans while the traditional agricultural sector of the economy was about to experience 
long-term contraction.  The landowning aristocracy saw a marked decline in their economic 
preeminence following the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 during the government of Sir Robert 
Peel.
11
  William Gladstone, future Prime Minister during the invasion and occupation of Egypt 
and free trade enthusiast, had begun his career in Parliament fourteen years earlier and was a 
protégé to Sir Robert Peel.
12
  Unlike the free trade Peelites, future Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli was in favor of the protectionist Corn Laws and continued to support tariffs that would 
benefit the traditional landowning elite.
13
  Later in their careers, the two statesmen would quarrel 
over the course of action taken in Egypt, a result of free trade and the creation of conditions 
where political intervention became necessary.
14
   
 The free trade movement beginning in the 1840s altered the domestic economic reality in 
Great Britain in favor of commercial and financial interests.  Even before the Corn Laws had 
been repealed a policy of encouraging free trade agreements with foreign governments was 
already in place.  For instance, the Treaty of Balta Liman of 1838 and the Treaty of London in 
1840, negotiated with the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, established free trade agreements that 
created new markets for British manufactured goods.
15
  Other agreements were made with Persia 
                                                 
10
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in 1836 and Japan in 1858.  In China, the inability to open and liberalize trade led to the Opium 
Wars of 1840 and 1857.
16
  The government was clearly willing to authorize state power either 
through international treaty agreements or military action in pursuit of economic goals in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.  What form state action took depended on the circumstances 
and was certainly open for debate. 
 Exporting manufactured goods and importing raw materials was undoubtedly one of the 
main goals of Victorian politicians.  Commercial and industrial ventures required capital from 
investors, a role which was originally filled by the landowning aristocracy and later by industrial 
financiers.  The investments and debts of the aristocracy came to be managed increasingly by 
bankers in the nineteenth century while the revenues from the agricultural economy 
simultaneously decreased.  These dual processes encouraged the entanglement of the landed elite 
and bankers in an ever-expanding web of financial necessity spun as far back as 1694.
17
  The 
financial dependency of the one class and the rising wealth of the other allowed for more social 
interaction and intermingling, bringing bankers into the gentlemanly fold.  In this socially mobile 
environment, Lionel Rothschild’s financial patronage of Disraeli during his early career as a 
novelist and his willingness to give assistance to a debt-riddled Disraeli in 1848 helped establish 
a friendship which lasted through their lives.
18
  As Jews, both men were outside the landed 
establishment and both sought respectability within society.  This interdependency needs to be 
expanded upon further for it is the basis of the theory of gentlemanly capitalist agency in British 
imperialism.  
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 Before 1850, landowning peers dominated the political landscape of Great Britain, which 
enabled them to maintain a preeminent position in economic and social life as well.
19
  Indeed, on 
the surface, the political status quo did not seem to change much following 1850; the small 
number of available positions in upper-level administration was open chiefly to those with 
private means and elite connections.  Some offices, like the Foreign Office, were dominated by 
peers until as late as 1914.  Similarly, the nineteenth century as a whole had more Prime 
Ministers from the House of Lords than from the House of Commons, despite the democratizing 
nature of the 1832 and 1867 Reform Acts.
20
  Therefore, it is not surprising that increasing profits 
and fortunes drove bankers and merchants to seek entrance into the gentlemanly class, from 
which they had previously been excluded due to their backgrounds and where they could mingle 
with the aristocracy and influence state policy.   
Several characteristics distinguished the English gentleman of the nineteenth century.  
Most important of all, a gentleman needed a proper education.  The landowning elite sent their 
children to public schools like Eton and then on to Oxford or Cambridge.
21
  Therefore, if a 
banking family like the Rothschilds or Goschens—already somewhat marginalized as Jews or 
foreigners
22
—or a wealthy merchant family like that of John Gladstone wanted their sons to 
become English gentlemen, an elite education was a necessity.
23
  For the Rothschilds, attending 
these institutions had little bearing on their future careers since they were likely to be recruited 
into the family firm.  Nathaniel Rothschild, the leading partner of the London branch of the bank 
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following his father’s death in 1879, attended Cambridge but did not achieve a degree.
24
  George 
Goschen was schooled at Rugby before seeking a scholarship at Trinity.
25
  Although the four 




Superficially, the failure of Nathaniel Rothschild and William Gladstone’s brothers to 
realize academic success may seem a waste of money.  However, public school and university 
were, in a sense, elite social clubs wherein future gentleman could be allowed to intermingle and 
exchange ideas.  For Nathaniel Rothschild, enrollment at Trinity College afforded him the 
opportunity to forge a friendship with the Prince of Wales.
27
  After leaving Trinity, Nathaniel 
successfully pursued a seat in the House of Commons.
28
  Goschen found employment with 
Frühling and Goschen, his family’s firm, and began his career in Parliament in 1859.
29
  
Similarly, the Gladstone boys’ enrollment in elite schools preceded stints in Parliament for 
each.
30
  Regardless of one’s success in public school, enrollment alone, if backed by socially 
enabling private means, seems to have provided the sons of bankers and merchants with a door 
into the Houses of Parliament. 
Another characteristic of the English gentleman in the nineteenth century was the 
leisurely nature of their occupation.  An English gentleman was expected to be removed from 
direct contact with the means of production and labor.
31
  Additionally, the free time afforded to a 
gentleman enabled him to pursue sport and study the arts of administration and leadership.
32
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Banking partners and financiers had both the time and money to pursue a gentlemanly life.  After 
making a fortune in the Anglo-American trade, John Gladstone retired to a life of foreign 
investment.
33
  The London Rothschilds were known to take short work days, sought membership 
in the popular social clubs of London, and purchased country estates, another signifier of the 
gentleman.
34
  Moreover, the Rothschilds and Goschens were primarily interested in lending to 
foreign governments, not commerce or industry.  They were therefore focused on returns, not 
development.  Generally speaking, wealthy bankers and merchants had worked their way into the 
social world of the English gentleman by the second half of the nineteenth century. 
As D.C.M. Platt has thoughtfully pointed out, “what record is likely to survive of an 
informal contact over a club bar, or of a conversation at dinner in a country house?”
35
  
Nevertheless, there need not be records for an observer to see an alignment of interests.  The 
theory of gentlemanly capitalism posits that “it is impossible to separate the world of 
‘acceptable’ business from that of elite politicians and from their perceptions of national 
interest.”
36
  In other words, the fraternizing of moneyed men and politicians in the social world is 
representative of the alignment of their interests.  Put simply, as the two groups intermingled and 
intermarried, so too did their interests.  Although disputes might have arisen over the particular 
course of action to take in a political or economic crisis, they were debated by members of the 
gentlemanly capitalist elite whose shared goals comprised the national interest.
37
 
Domestically, the gentlemanly capitalist elite were particularly instrumental in two 
economic crises in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  The so-called bimetallism 
controversy in the 1880s and 1890s was, in essence, a debate over the validity of the gold 
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standard.  While some economists supported the abandonment of the gold standard most City 
bankers—including Goschen
38
—supported its continuation.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
chose to uphold the gold standard, a reflection of the shared understanding of national economic 
interest between bankers and government.
39
  Similarly, the Baring Crisis, in which the Baring 
Brothers had underwritten loans to Argentina without sufficient liquidity, also precipitated 
government action.  This crisis differed from the financial crisis of the 1860s in which the 
finance house Overend, Gurney, and Company was allowed to fail.  Unlike 1866, the Baring 
Crisis of 1890 was resolved by swift action by the Bank of England, the Exchequer, and several 
private banks to establish a fund that would guarantee Barings’ solvency.
40
  This nineteenth 
century case of “too big to fail” exemplified the seamless interaction between government and 
finance by gentlemanly capitalists. 
Foreign bondholders, for their part, were happy to let a form of laissez-faire investment 
capitalism reign, as long as there was stability for their investments.
41
  In cases where instability 
threatened the financial and commercial order, there was discussion about the proper course to 
take.  In South America, the proper course was to remain unofficially involved and protect 
Anglo-American relations that were underlined by tacit approval of the Monroe Doctrine.  
Although investments in South America were large, excessive state intervention there may have 
disrupted the flow of investment to the United States.
42
  Therefore, when bondholders needed 
representation in the new South American republics, they relied on consuls to act in an unofficial 
capacity to represent them.
43
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In Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, other circumstances dictated the exact course to be 
taken in order to insure the national interest.  The British perception of Ottoman decline placed 
the region now called the Middle East in the forefront of strategic thought.  Ottoman territory 
provided a buffer against Russian advances in Asia and the Balkans that might threaten the 
security of British India.  British strategy toward the Eastern Question required the preservation 
of the Ottoman Empire.  During the Crimean War, the Rothschilds furnished the Porte’s first 
foreign loan, guaranteed by both the British and French governments.
44
  That guarantee meant 
that the British government was bound to insure interest payments to the bondholders, out of its 
own pockets if necessary.
45
  In return for a guarantee on the loan, the British government 
retained the right to appoint representatives for oversight into the loan’s deployment.
46
  Although 
that right was not exercised, these terms established the norms for state intervention on behalf of 
bondholders in other cases.  In both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, internal and external 
developments during the nineteenth century created different contexts for the protection of 
European interests.  
Of particular interest for this study are the events that followed Mehmed Ali’s 
assumption of power and the effects that programs of consolidation and centralization had on 
Egypt as a whole.  The nineteenth century in Egypt can be roughly divided into three separate 
eras: the era of centralization and expansion through monopolies which lasted until 1840; the era 
of free trade and development through state borrowing lasting until 1875; and the period of direct 
European involvement in state affairs ultimately defined by the invasion and occupation by Great 
Britain and subsequent administration under Evelyn Baring.   
                                                 
44
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 Mehmed Ali was an Albanian Ottoman army officer intent on establishing his own 
dynastic state; therefore, despite the claims of Egyptian nationalist historians, Ali should not be 
considered the father of modern Egyptian nationhood, although his reforms would give rise to it 
circumstantially.  Accordingly, to some degree Colonel ‘Urabi’s attempted nationalist revolution 
in 1882 can trace its roots to the military system founded and expanded by Mehmed Ali.  The 
creation of an Egyptian army relied entirely on conscription of the peasantry, who were often 
unwilling to fight in wars of conquest, and enslavement in the Sudan.
47
  By developing his own 
military strength, Ali consolidated his power in the international arena; domestically, he removed 
Mamluks from power, violently, and co-opted other elites.
48
 
 In order to fund an increasingly large military, economic reform was a necessity.  When 
Mehmed Ali assumed power in 1805, the Egyptian economy was largely agricultural and such 
industry that existed had not been exposed to mass-mechanized means of production.
49
  In the 
agricultural sector, the practice of tax-farming, in which a multazim would acquire land from the 
state and collect taxes from the peasantry while utilizing his own tax-free portion, was phased 
out during Ali’s early reign.  If a multazim was unable to collect the taxes assigned to him, the 
corresponding land was confiscated by the state and redistributed to a member of Ali’s network.  
This process of reallocating land was complemented by official cadastral surveys and the levying 
of uniform and direct taxes.  Moreover, the residents of land now under direct taxation by the 
state were simultaneously forced to grow certain crops that Mehmed Ali wished to export.  In 
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this way, Ali created state monopolies in the agricultural sector and realized increases in 
revenue.
50
   
Additionally, Ali attempted to develop a domestic industrial sector to relieve Egypt of its 
reliance on imported goods.  Factories were built not only for the production of goods such as 
textiles and glass, but also to produce the complex machinery needed for industrial growth.
51
  Ali 
hoped that these government-owned factories would produce goods for both domestic 
consumption and external trade.  Numerous attempts were made to protect new industries by 
encouraging Egyptians to buy Egyptian goods; however, these protectionist policies were 
waylaid by Ottoman control of customs duties and eventually dissolved by international treaty 
toward the end of Ali’s reign.
52
  Despite difficulties, these economic reforms were able to create 
industrial and agricultural monopolies that funded a new Egyptian army. 
The army allowed Mehmed Ali to invade the Levant and challenge the authority of the 
Porte over Egypt and greater Syria.  The campaign to re-conquer Mecca and Medina from the 
Wahabis at the Porte’s urging in 1813 gave Mehmed Ali’s oldest son, Ibrahim, the title of 
governor of the Hijaz.  The expanding Egyptian empire now had control over the Red Sea 
trade.
53
  Similarly, the Porte requested Ali’s assistance in the unsuccessful campaign against the 
Greek independence movement.  Following defeat in Greece, Ibrahim invaded and occupied 
Ottoman Syria where he was established as governor of the province under the Porte’s decree.
54
  
Mehmed Ali’s wars of conquest had expanded the territory under his control to cover Egypt, the 
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Sudan, the Hijaz, and Syria by 1833.  This proto-empire was to be short-lived; Egypt’s expansion 
threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain would soon intervene. 
In 1838, the Sublime Porte signed an agreement with Great Britain—the Treaty of Balta 
Liman—which dissolved monopolies within the Ottoman Empire while granting British 
merchants the right to purchase and sell goods subject to a relatively favorable three percent 
tariff.
55
  The Porte agreed to the terms hoping that it would limit Mehmed Ali’s growing power 
by forcing him into direct conflict with Great Britain.
56
  Ali’s refusal of the terms did lead to a 
confrontation with Britain; in the summer of 1840 Anglo-Turkish troops landed in Beirut and 
helped incite a rebellion against Egyptian rule throughout Syria.
57
  Forced from Syria, Mehmed 
Ali consented to the terms of the Treaty of London (1840), which reiterated the commercial 
agreement of Balta Liman, forced Egypt to remove its claim over the Holy Cities, and drastically 
limited his military capabilities.  In accepting the terms, Mehmed Ali received a concession that 
granted hereditary rule over Egypt and Sudan with the succession going to his oldest male 
relative.
58
  This was a watershed moment for Egypt in several respects: first, the military 
capabilities of Egypt were severely limited; second, the family of Mehmed Ali was guaranteed 
succession but remained bound to the Sublime Porte; and third, industrial and commercial 
reforms were undone, restricting the state’s ability to produce revenue through monopolization 
and forcing the government to look abroad to finance public projects.  
Mehmed Ali would continue to rule Egypt as Viceroy until 1848 when he was replaced 
by his son, Ibrahim, due to illness.  Ibrahim died shortly after assuming power and was in turn 
replaced by his nephew, Abbas.  Under Abbas, Egypt’s military capabilities were reduced as 
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dictated by the terms of the Treaty of London and to help economize the state’s expenditures.
59
  
Abbas also authorized the construction of a railway between Alexandria and Cairo at the urging 
of Britain’s consul-general and several directors of the British Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company.  The railway was built using supplies purchased in Britain under the 
direction of British engineers, but with Egyptian capital and labor.
60
  British capitalists flocked to 
Egypt and British influence in Egypt would be ascendant until Abbas’s death later that year.
61
  
Importantly, these British capitalists were involved directly in the development of infrastructure 
and therefore had an interest in the actualization of projects, unlike later financiers issuing 
government loans. 
Under Said, Egypt turned toward France for foreign development.  The Viceroy 
developed a personal relationship with Ferdinand de Lesseps through which a concession was 
given for the construction of the Suez Canal.
62
  Despite British opposition to the canal scheme—
due to commercial and financial interests in Egyptian railways and fear of French dominance in 
Egypt—the Suez Canal Company was formed and in 1858 issued 400,000 shares of stock for 
public purchase.  Over 200,000 were bought in France while Said purchased 64,000.  Shares 
were set aside for British subscribers but there was no initial investment.  In 1860, over one 
quarter of the original shares were still unsubscribed and Said was induced to purchase them.
63
  
Egypt did not have the capital to finance these additional shares and the Viceroy turned to 
financiers in France for a loan in September of 1860.
64
  This would be the first in a series of 
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loans with extremely unfavorable terms that Egypt would contract over the following decade and 
a half. 
British reluctance to subscribe to the Suez Canal project reveals an interesting dimension 
of gentlemanly capitalism.  Capitalists with an adventuresome spirit were willing to back British 
projects like the Nile Navigation Company.  Funded mainly by British capital, the company 
collapsed in the early 1860s and Said directed the Egyptian Treasury to purchase the company’s 
shares at a large cost.
65
  However, the City’s financial houses, including aspiring gentlemanly 
capitalists like the Rothschilds and Goschens, were much less willing to be involved in staple 
industrial and commercial ventures as such, preferring government loans with high interest rates.  
Under such principles, Suez Canal shares did not seem to offer attractive returns.  Nevertheless, 
as borrowing accelerated under Said and Ismail, financiers in Britain were increasingly involved 
in Egyptian government loans which were channeled into development projects by the recipient 
state.     
From 1863-1873, Ismail, Abbas’ successor, undertook seven foreign loans worth 69 
million pounds sterling at an average interest rate of 10%.  Of the nominal total, Egypt actually 
received 46 million.  A large portion of the sums received went directly to servicing Egypt’s 
debt.
66
  A small percentage of Egypt’s expenditure went to the Porte in the form of tribute, which 
was doubled in 1867 in exchange for succession by primogeniture and official recognition as 
Khedive. The remainder was used on internal development.  Ismail expanded irrigation to 
encourage cotton cultivation, which had become extremely profitable thanks to reduced 
American production during the Civil War; the harbor in Alexandria was deepened and widened; 
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roads were paved; and bridges were built.  While some of the projects were undoubtedly 
beneficial, others—such as palace-building—drained Ismail’s finances unnecessarily.
67
 
Egypt was not alone in its growing dependence on European finance.  In the 1860s, 
bankers and financiers flocked to Istanbul as well as Alexandria, either to establish 
correspondent offices for their European banks or to act as mediators for loans.
68
  In Egypt, 
British capital helped establish the Anglo-Egyptian Bank and continental bankers like 
Oppenheim, Chambert, and Company lent and managed capital for private and public 
investors.
69
  In the Ottoman Empire, the Imperial Ottoman Bank acted locally on behalf of its 
British and French backers.
70
  Like Khedive Ismail, Sultan Abdul Aziz spent borrowed-money 
enthusiastically for development projects which served the underlying aim of centralizing state 
authority.
71
  That spending in Cairo and Istanbul was out of control is clear; however, European 
financiers were no less at fault for facilitating bankruptcies through recklessly exploitative 
lending practices. 
Ismail developed a close working relationship with Eduard Dervieu, a French financier, 
who acted as a personal banker and unofficial adviser to the Khedive during his reign.  Thanks to 
connections with both the Khedive and European financiers, Dervieu’s career was made by 
encouraging the two sides to do business with one another.
72
  Although there does not appear to 
have been a similar figure in the contemporary Ottoman financial realm, bankers were certainly 
encouraging the Porte’s borrowing and may have been able to destroy the political careers of 
Ottoman ministers who refused to accept loans.
73
  Generally speaking, the unfavorable terms of 
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Ottoman and Egyptian bonds meant investors had a high profit potential.  Conversely, Egypt and 
the Ottoman Empire were not receiving the full amount of subscribed capital and were still 
obligated to return the nominal value with interest.   
For both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, increasing integration into a European 
dominated global economy precipitated foreign indebtedness.  In both cases, ostentatious 
spending encouraged by predatory lending led to massive indebtedness by 1875: in Egypt the 
debt was approximately ninety million pounds sterling while in the Ottoman Empire the debt was 
over two hundred million.
74
  Although the policies that had led Cairo and Istanbul to this point 
were in some respects identical, the routes taken after 1875 were different.  Between 1875 and 
1881—particularly following the Berlin Congress in 1878—the Porte negotiated with 
representatives of European bondholders and the Powers.  The Decree of Mouharrem in 1881 
established the PDA as a body to manage Ottoman finances.
75
  Despite the creation of a similar 
body in Egypt in 1876, stability was not achieved and by late 1882 Egypt had been invaded and 
occupied by Britain.   
The emergence of Germany as a mediator in resolving the Russo-Ottoman crisis of 1877-
1878 signaled a turn in Britain’s ability to influence the Ottoman Empire.  As the Porte looked 
increasingly to Germany and built a relationship that would last until World War I, Britain had 
already embarked on a transformed relationship with Egypt that would deepen in the decade to 
come.  Both British bondholders and the British government found themselves heavily invested 
in the financial well-being of Egypt; with the purchase of the Khedive’s Suez Canal shares, the 
British government became a bondholder by another name.   
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Chapter 2 - Government Bonds and Imperial Occupation 
 
When the program of foreign borrowing began, Egypt was experiencing a boom in cotton 
prices thanks to disruption of cotton production in the United States during the Civil War.  By 
1870, American cotton production had revived and the 1873 global financial crisis depressed 
commodity prices, further hampering Egypt’s ability to meet its obligations.
76
  In 1873 over half 
of Egypt’s funded debt was owned by British bondholders.
77
  Frühling and Goschen alone had 
issued over ten million pounds between 1862 and 1866, all in London.  Moreover, if a loan was 
extended by a body such as the Anglo-Egyptian Bank or the Imperial Ottoman Bank, a majority 
of its shares were issued in London.
78
  It is important to recognize that these were not held by the 
British government but by independent bondholders who were represented by the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders, a body composed of British financiers that extended credit to foreign 
governments.
79
  Nonetheless, in 1878 at least four MPs sat in the Council, including both Deputy 
Chairmen.
80
  These four MPs represent the overlap between private and state interests in 
gentlemanly capitalism. 
 Egypt’s financial situation in 1875 was dire.  Ismail needed a loan desperately in order to 
meet his debt obligations, but Egypt’s existing external debt and yearly budget deficits had 
destroyed the state’s credit.
81
  Unable to negotiate a new loan, the Khedive began to market his 
Suez Canal Company shares to raise the necessary capital.  Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, 
informed the consul-general in Egypt, General Stanton, that he had “received information that a 
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combination of French capitalists [were] offering to buy from the Khedive his interest in the 
Suez Canal.”
82
  Stanton confirmed the offer and noted that Derby’s subsequent offer for the 
British government to purchase the shares was well received.
83
  According to Derby, “it [was] of 
great importance that the Viceroy’s interest in the Suez Canal should not fall into the hands of a 
foreign company,” a view reiterated by Prime Minister Disraeli during the first session of 
Parliament in 1876.
84
  Derby authorized Stanton to negotiate a transaction in which Great Britain 
would purchase the Khedive’s shares for approximately four million pounds sterling.
85
 
 Since Parliament was not in session and the Bank of England was not able to act as the 
financial instrument of the British Government, the Rothschilds were approached.  The 
agreement proposed by the Rothschilds offered to purchase the shares at four million pounds 
sterling in installments with a commission of two and one half percent.  Also, the Rothschilds 
would receive the five percent interest on the shares—a replacement for the shares’ mortgaged 
dividends—due to the British government until the total amount had been repaid.  As security 
against this “heavy liability”, the Rothschilds wanted written confirmation that the government 
would “endeavour to obtain the necessary powers to enable them to repay the advance, and pay 
Messrs. Rothschild’s commission as soon as may be practicable.”
86
  The transaction was not a 
loan in the strictest sense; rather, as Disraeli described it, the government asked “will you 
purchase these shares on our engagement that we will ask the House of Commons to take them 
off your hands?”
87
  As understood by the Rothschilds, both the commission and interest would 
be charged to and paid by the British government, a bridging loan by another name.
88
  Either 
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way, according to both the Rothschilds and Disraeli this transaction posed a great risk.  However, 
it seems that if the government refused to “take them off their hands,” the Rothschilds would 
have been owners of nearly half the Suez Canal Company with guaranteed interest payments of 
two hundred thousand pounds due annually, hardly a “great risk.”
89
   
 Two questions regarding this transaction stand out.  First, why was the British 
government so concerned about the Suez shares falling into the hands of a foreign company? 
Second, what does the cooperation between the government and the Rothschilds reveal about 
gentlemanly capitalism?  In response to the first, only two years before this transaction a dispute 
between the Suez Canal Company and the British government had arisen over tonnage duties.  
Essentially, the dispute concerned the way in which net tonnage was measured and charged.  It 
was settled by a commission in Istanbul, but de Lesseps, unhappy with the terms of the 
agreement, threatened to close the Canal.  A force of ten thousand Egyptian soldiers was 
deployed under the command of a British officer to seize control should de Lesseps proceed.  
Sufficiently threatened, de Lesseps backed down and agreed to the settlement.
90
  For Disraeli, 
threats to close the Canal to British ships were proof that one company’s control of the Canal 
was dangerous to British commercial and strategic interests.
91
  Therefore, British government 




 This leads directly into the second question.  The government did not have four million 
pounds lying dormant in the Treasury and since the Bank of England could only be petitioned 
through Parliament, a private banker was needed.  According to Disraeli, “the Bank of England 
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would no more have advanced £4,000,000 for the purchase of these shares, and taken the 
responsibility of holding them upon themselves, than they would have paid off the National 
Debt.”
93
  Thankfully, he was a close friend of Baron Rothschild and was therefore quick to 
contact the Baron regarding the potential purchase.
94
  The transaction would not have happened 
had Disraeli not been adamant about it.  Indeed, in a letter to the Queen on November 18
th
, 
Disraeli expressed that “it is vital to your Majesty’s authority and power at this critical moment, 
that the Canal should belong to England, and I was so decided and absolute with Lord Derby on 
this head, that he ultimately adopted my views.”
95
   
 There was no shortage of disagreement in Parliament regarding the purchase.  Gladstone 
recognized that a commitment to purchase the shares had been made and it would be 
irresponsible to renege on funding.  However, in paying two and one half percent commission 
with five percent interest for an advance that was to last only a few months, the actual per annum 
interest rate was around fifteen percent.  Additionally, since the Khedive had mortgaged the 
dividends to his shares and forfeited his rights to act as a Director, the British government would 
receive no representation on the board.  Gladstone noted “that the government [was] not aware of 
the limited extent of voting power attached to those shares.”
96
  The lack of awareness is 
ignorance at best: without voting power how could the government possibly hope to guarantee 
the security of communication and transportation through the Canal?  Consultations between 
Colonel Stokes and de Lesseps would later produce an agreement whereby three Englishmen 
would be granted seats on the Company’s board and Britain would not be deprived of its voting 
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  Nevertheless, the quick action taken by the government to purchase shares without first 
undertaking to negotiate for voting rights betrays the notion that the purchase held purely 
strategic goals as a priority.   
 Interestingly, Sir Stafford Northcote, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, admitted that “we 
knew that we were taking a step outside of strict law” by engaging the Rothschilds in this 
transaction.
98
  Indeed, they had broken with norms of governmental action developed over the 
course of a century.  However, since the Suez Canal was, by its very nature, an unparalleled 
engineering feat, “the conduct of the Government could not be precisely in accordance with any 
precedent.”
99
  Therefore, while the actions of the state may have seemed undesirable in February, 
they were deemed necessary in November.  Since the state alone was unable to fund the 
protection of the British national interest, as defined above, with sufficient haste, they turned to a 
private firm.  The Rothschilds willingness to participate in the scheme reveals two things: a 
linkage between state interests and potential financial gains; and the ability of an outsider firm 
like the Rothschilds to align itself with the establishment.  Even more importantly, the purchase 
gave the British government a financial stake in a private company operating on foreign soil and 
in the Egyptian government’s ability to pay its obligations.   
 It must be noted that within two years of the Canal’s opening, the Khedive had already 
expressed an interest in selling his shares to a British company.
100
  At that time, the Board of 
Trade understood that British ownership of the Canal would be extremely beneficial for 
commercial purposes.  However, the Canal would need substantial oversight and the British 
government “would then be responsible for the acts of a body over which they would have no 
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substantial control, and might be placed in a very embarrassing relation to foreign 
Governments.”
101
  The first government of the Liberal Gladstone (1868-1874) was fully aware of 
the potential for conflict that would arise from involvement in the affairs of the Suez Canal 
Company long before his Conservative successor’s government made the purchase.  The 
transaction in 1875 should therefore be seen as the fulfillment of the Khedive’s ultimate goal of 
selling his shares to reach financial solvency.  Under Gladstone, the British government had no 
interest in purchasing the shares or encouraging a private firm to do so.  Under Disraeli, the 
threat of total French control of the Canal to British interests was enough to induce the 
government to act.   
While the Khedive looked for buyers, he also asked for British assistance in Egypt’s 
financial affairs.  On October 20, 1875, the Khedive requested the assistance of a “competent 
Government official…to assist his Minister of Finance in remedying the confusion which His 
Highness admitted existed in the Department of his Administration.”
102
  Britain appointed Mr. 
Cave, the Paymaster-General, to go to Egypt and report on the financial situation.
103
  Cave’s 
report outlined the total revenue and expenditure expected in the future and noted that “if the 
gravity of the situation is explained to the bondholders they will consent to an arrangement for 
securing to them a fair return on their loans.”
104
  Since the sale of the Suez shares had done little 
to improve Egypt’s finances, the Caisse de la Dette, an international commission, was 
established with the goal of representing bondholder interests.
105
  The system of Dual Control in 
which one French and one British controller-general were to manage revenue and expenditure 
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  Evelyn Baring, the youngest son of the Baring banking 
family, was given the task of representing Britain.  Although not directly affiliated with the bank, 
Baring did correspond regularly with his brothers and had connections with other City firms.
107
  
Great Britain thus found itself acting in a semi-official capacity through an agent approved by 
the government to guard bondholder interests. 
 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, acting through banker and MP for the City of 
London George Goschen, also participated in the adjustment and consolidation of the Egyptian 
debt.  Before leaving for Egypt, Goschen had asked the Foreign Office to “point out to the 
Government of the Khedive how unfairly the holders of the bonds of these loans had been dealt 
with.”
108
  Goschen asked for assistance knowing that British bondholders held over half of the 
nominal total of Egyptian debt in 1876.
109
  Upon being informed of Goschen’s mission, Derby 
instructed the consul in Alexandria to “give such unofficial assistance as you can,” adding that 
“Mr. Goschen was a member of the late Cabinet, and is a person of high position and reputation 
in this country.”
110
  The irony of officially instructing an officer to act unofficially 
notwithstanding, Goschen used his status as an MP to gain leverage in negotiation regarding his 
own financial interest in Egypt.
111
  Moreover, Goschen was praised by the Council for his efforts 
in providing an adequate adjustment of the Egyptian loans during autumn 1876.
112
  Northcote 
asserted that while Goschen “received from the English government a certain amount of 
support…[he] conducted [his] business entirely on [his] own account.”
113
  Northcote goes on to 
describe how the settlement between the Khedive and the bondholders collapsed due to 
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seemingly insufficient revenue and Britain intervened through the consul-general.
114
  Goschen’s 
mission was a perfect manifestation of the gentlemanly capitalist linkage between private finance 
and government.   
In order to placate bondholders in response to Ismail’s revenue shortage, a loan of eight 
and one half million pounds was extended by the Rothschilds to the Egyptian state.
115
  This loan 
transferred the Khedive’s private land to the state as security, a result of negotiations using 
Baring as a middleman.
116
  Revenues from the mortgaged land would be “managed by a 
Commission of three, which [would] consist of an Egyptian, a Commissioner nominated by the 
English Government, and a commissioner nominated by the French Government,” and would 
“remit the proceeds to Messrs. Rothschild.”
117
  For Great Britain, the Rothschilds could be used 
to maintain Egypt’s financial health.  For the Rothschilds, the British government represented a 
door into an increasingly British Egypt open to more lucrative loans.
118
  Once again, the interests 
of state officials and financiers were aligned in Egypt. 
 By 1879, conflict between the Caisse de la Dette, the dual-controllers, and the Egyptian 
government was nonetheless delaying financial reforms deemed necessary by the European 
representatives.  As the British controller-general, Evelyn Baring had clashed with Khedive 
Ismail over the steps needed to bring about financial solvency since his appointment in 1877.
119
  
Baring felt strongly that “no sacrifice should be demanded from the creditors until every 
reasonable sacrifice had been made by the debtors.”
120
  This statement is particularly noteworthy 
since Baring went on to lament the fact that the debt had to be repaid by brutally collecting taxes 
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  In autumn 1878, the Khedive retained the services of two Europeans 
in the government as Finance Minister and Minister of Public Works, “an assurance that he was 
engaged upon a serious and honest experiment [in reform].”
122
  Ismail, however, wished to 
pursue his own method of financial reform and proposed an interest rate reduction of one half 
percent.  Since the European ministers did not agree, Ismail dismissed them.
123
  Following their 
dismissal, Lord Salisbury, then Disraeli’s Foreign Secretary, declared that Britain was committed 
to “defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking the arrangements best calculated to secure 
the good government and prosperity of the country.”
124
  Salisbury would later become Prime 
Minister—briefly in 1885 and again in 1886—when the British occupation was becoming firmly 
entrenched.  British interests, of course, were linked implicitly to the maximization of rates of 
return for gentlemanly capitalists through sound and austere management of Egyptian finances.    
 In a revealing letter on June 18, 1879, Salisbury further enunciated his views on the 
British position.  Since the Khedive’s mismanagement had failed to meet the reforms deemed 
necessary, Britain, in concert with France, was predisposed to protect its own interests in Egypt.  
Moreover, “the geographical situation of Egypt, as well as the responsibility which the English 
government had in the past incurred for the actual conditions under which it exists as a state, 
make it impossible for them to leave it to its fate.”
125
  In other words, since Great Britain had 
intervened in Egyptian affairs to protect commercial and financial interests in the past—
including free trade agreements and the purchase of Suez Canal shares—they could not allow 
Egypt to shirk its obligations.  The responsibility that Britain envisaged for itself, and the 
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Khedive’s unwillingness to abdicate, enabled the government, alongside France, to pressure the 
Porte to depose Ismail and transfer power to his son, Tawfiq.
126
  Prior to this moment, Great 
Britain had remained somewhat indirect in its action toward Egypt, preferring to influence 
Egyptian affairs through financial advisers.  With this action, however, Britain established a new 
precedent whereby official state power could be used to effect reform in Egypt that would 
benefit bondholders while securing British strategic goals.      
 Britain’s involvement in Ismail’s deposition was not the beginning of a policy of direct 
intervention.  Gladstone’s second government, which came to power in 1880, was not willing to 
commit itself to a more forceful policy towards Egypt.  On the contrary, it expressed a strong 
desire to remain indirectly interested.  In 1881, Lord Granville articulated British policy to Sir 
Edward Malet, the British consul-general in Cairo, noting “the policy of Her Majesty’s 
Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full 
enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan.”
127
  The 
Sultan’s successive firmans had granted Egypt its autonomous status and preserved the 
Khedive’s line as successors, creating a state that was stable and beneficial to British interests.  
Egypt’s prosperity was important to Britain due to the vast private investment in Egyptian debt 
as well as the government’s part-ownership of the Suez Canal.  Although Granville was not 
calling for any particular involvement in Egypt, he was linking the stake Great Britain had in 
Egypt—both financial and strategic—with a supposed concern for the welfare of Egypt itself.  
Despite the Liberals’ ideological unwillingness to intervene directly in Egypt, the Conservatives’ 
position vis-à-vis Ismail’s deposition, like the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, was not 
fundamentally liquidated and would lead to even more intervention.  
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 Almost immediately following Tawfiq’s assumption of power his sovereignty was 
threatened from within Egypt.  The Chamber of Notables, a semi-constitutional body created by 
Ismail in 1866, had been unable to exercise power until Tawfiq’s rule.  Beginning in 1881, 
however, conflict with the Chamber destabilized the Khedive’s regime.
128
  Britain and France, 
aware of the threat posed to the Khedive and thus their interests, issued a joint note in January 
1882 stating their resolve in maintaining the Khedive’s authority.  Again, the note stops short of 
adopting forceful policy, but “the determination of England and France to afford [the Khedive 
and his government] support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with 
the course of public affairs in Egypt” does imply a willingness to intervene if necessary.
129
  The 
resolve of the two powers was to be tested later that year. 
 The conflict with the Notables continued to escalate throughout the winter and spring of 
1882 as Colonel ‘Urabi assumed the leadership of a burgeoning nationalist movement.  There is 
no doubt that the large number of foreigners employed in the Khedive’s government, particularly 
British and French, added to the discontent.
130
  The Chamber of Notables, aware of the influence 
these European advisers had on state policy, demanded that they be given voting rights on the 
budget in place of the Council of Ministers.  In response, the two controllers-general issued a 
note to both Britain and France expressing their fear that the Chamber “was certainly disposed to 
eliminate the European element from the administration of the country.”
131
  Moreover, the 
Chamber’s desire to intervene in the state’s finances by voting on the budget was an attempt to 
gain voting rights over “all contracts with European functionaries and concessions to 
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  Should the Chamber have succeeded the financial interests of Britain and France 
would have been in jeopardy.  The conflict between the notables and the Khedive can therefore 
be seen as a financial matter in which the Khedive’s government, supported by and supportive of 
British and French interests, was challenged.  European involvement in Egyptian political affairs 
was inevitable as the Khedive was increasingly associated with Europeans. 
 Importantly, in the winter of 1882 there was no longer any mention of safeguarding the 
Suez Canal.  Instead, the focus was on preserving the international arrangements made for 
settling the Egyptian debt crisis.  With that in mind, Britain could not “be indifferent to events 
which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and destroy the results of efforts which have been 
successfully made during the last few years to improve the condition of the country.”
133
  The 
efforts to which Granville referred were all directed at improving the state of Egypt’s finances.  
Disorder in Egypt was a threat to the financial health of Egypt and by extension the financial 
security of foreign bondholders.  By summer, disorder had reached a climax.  On June 11, riots 
in Alexandria killed at least forty-nine people, of which three-fourths were European.
134
  In the 
face of claims that ‘Urabi had instigated the riots, Sir Charles Dilke, undersecretary at the 
Foreign Office, noted that “the statement that soldiers assisted in the late riot at Alexandria is, 
according to all the information we possess, the opposite of the truth.”
135
  The European consuls-
general in Egypt decided that a commission of inquiry into the causes of the riot was 
unnecessary.
136
  If there was suspicion that ‘Urabi was indeed responsible for inciting the riot, it 
was not substantiated, nor was this a political factor in late-June.   
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 On June 23, reports that ‘Urabi had nevertheless placed three vessels full of explosives in 
the Suez Canal for potential sabotage revived the British government’s latent fear for the future 
of its strategic interest in Egypt.
137
  The construction of earthwork fortifications and gun batteries 
in Alexandria alarmed British officials enough to instruct Admiral Seymour, commander of the 
British fleet positioned in Alexandria, to demand the cessation of construction.  Seymour was 
instructed to prevent any attempt to continue construction.
138
  On July 11, Seymour bombarded 
Alexandria, an action that the British government regarded as self-defense.
139
  On July 29, the 
British fleet moved to secure and hold the Suez Canal.
140
  Britain’s move to secure the Canal was 
met with protestation from de Lesseps, who felt that Britain was abrogating its neutrality.  The 
British directors in the Suez Canal Company noted that the government’s action stemmed from 
the assertion “on apparently good grounds that [‘Urabi] intends, as a last resource, to take 
measures to injure British trade by blocking the Canal.”
141
  On August 4, General Wolseley was 
sent to Egypt “in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the 
Firmans of the Sultan and existing international engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that 
country.”
142
  Wolseley’s expedition landed on the banks of the canal on August 16 and 
proceeded to crush ‘Urabi’s army on a march to Tel al-Kabir, where the Egyptian army was 
destroyed.  On September 15, just over three months after the riot in Alexandria, the British 
military occupied Cairo and arrested ‘Urabi.
143
 
 Why had Britain proceeded without French cooperation in its invasion of Egypt?  The 
joint note of January 1882 was a clear example of cooperation with regard to their shared interest 
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in Egypt, yet nine months later Britain found itself as the sole occupier.  According to the British 
Ambassador in France, the French government was unwilling to pursue a joint military action for 
two reasons: first, they expected half of their troops would die of illness due to the season; and 
second, they believed that ‘Urabi “would lose strength by the lapse of time.”
144
  Additionally, 
France was fearful that involvement in Egypt would prevent it from defending against a German 
invasion.
145
  Britain was forced to act unilaterally after Prime Minster Freycinet’s government 
collapsed following disputes over funding an expeditionary force and the French naval units off 
Alexandria disengaged.  While a small contingent of Ottoman soldiers was present in the 
invasion, it was decidedly British.  
 The decision to invade was primarily concerned with the preservation of the Khedive’s 
authority and, secondarily, the protection of the Suez Canal.  Preserving the Khedive’s authority 
meant preserving the international agreements made regarding the Egyptian debt.  Following the 
invasion, discussion of the introduction of liberal institutions in Egypt hinged on the ability of 
such institutions to fulfill Egypt’s international obligations.  According to Lord Dufferin, the 
British Ambassador in Istanbul, over the course of 1882 the Chamber of Notables had “refused 
to recognize Egypt’s international obligations.”
146
  As Gladstone understood, the bondholders’ 
rights rested on these international obligations.
147
  There existed a very clear connection between 
the British government’s desire to preserve the Khedive and his international engagements, and 
those international engagements’ importance to bondholders.  Regardless of the threat ‘Urabi did 
or did not pose to Egyptian stability, the British perceived his actions as contrary to the 
international engagements the Khedive had entered and, therefore, to financial interests.  The 
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reports of anarchy in Egypt served to consolidate British opinion and encourage action on the 
grounds of securing the Suez Canal. The perceived threat to the Suez Canal should not be 
disregarded; however, throughout the summer of 1882 the primary goal for Great Britain was a 
preservation of the status quo in which the Khedive reigned under British tutelage.   
 Following the invasion, Britain set about reorganizing the Egyptian administration.  
Britain chose Sir Evelyn Baring to fill the role of consul-general in Egypt, succeeding Edward 
Malet.  After serving as controller-general of the Egyptian debt, Baring had served in India 
where he helped balance the budget and sought external funding for infrastructural development 
from the Rothschilds.
148
  This was the second time Baring had used his connections to the 
Rothschilds and he would approach them for another loan in 1884.
149
  Baring noted that “there 
was only one practicable method by which the Egyptian administration could be reformed: by 
placing the government more or less under British guidance.”
150
  His background as a finance 
minister and controller-general gave him the experience needed to reform Egypt’s financial 
system and solidify Britain’s paramount position.   
 Immediately, however, conflict in the Sudan between the Mahdi and Egyptian forces 
further extended and entrenched British control in Egypt.  The Mahdi was leading a revolt 
against Egyptian forces throughout the Sudan and attempting to establish independence in the 
wake of Egypt’s defeat and occupation.  A British-led expedition sent to quell the uprising ended 
in disaster.  In reporting the failure of the expedition to Granville, Baring described the Egyptian 
government as intransigent and unwilling to cede territory.  He noted that the “maladministration 
of successive Egyptian governments” was the main cause of the revolt.
151
  In response, Granville 
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gave Baring instructions that would alter the British role significantly.  Granville instructed 
Baring to make clear that “the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her 
Majesty’s Government to insist on the adoption of policy which they recommend, and that it will 
be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to 
hold their offices.”
152
  Put simply, any advice given by Baring should be taken as an order and if 
an Egyptian minister was unwilling to follow that order, he would be sacked.  This marked a 
significant change in the policy of Great Britain; not only was the army now occupying Egypt, 
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In addition to the factors already noted, the invasion and occupation of Egypt should be 
seen within the context of dialectically oscillating imperialism under Disraeli and Gladstone.  
Disraeli’s pro-Ottoman diplomacy during the Russo-Ottoman crisis of 1877-8 was replaced by 
Gladstone’s opposition.
 153
  Coupled with the presence of large amounts of Egyptian bonds in the 
City, a situation was created where intervention became necessary.  The “veiled protectorate” in 
Egypt established in 1882 under the trusteeship of Evelyn Baring was further entrenched under 
Lord Salisbury’s government (1886-1890).  Unlike Disraeli, who had continued the long-
standing support for Ottoman integrity, Gladstone supported a more independent Khedivate in 
Egypt, especially after the loss of British influence in Istanbul.
154
  Additionally, Gladstone had 
committed around half of his investment portfolio to Egyptian bonds in the 1870s.
155
  This can 
almost certainly be ruled out as a cause for Gladstone’s invasion, but it reveals how strong the 
links between finance and government were.  Like Goschen, Gladstone exemplified gentlemanly 
capitalism’s combination of finance and government as a circumstantially conditioning factor in 
policy consciousness. 
 The main goal of invasion—preserving the Khedive’s authority and maintaining 
international financial agreements—was not easily accomplished.  Spurred on by Evelyn 
Baring’s autocratic management and his belief that Egyptians were unable to govern themselves 
effectively
156
, Britain was induced to remain despite Gladstone’s desire to withdraw.
157
  Under 
Baring, the notion that Egyptians were a subject race in need of guidance became 
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institutionalized and would spread to other parts of the British Empire.  In the metropolis, 
Salisbury, who had made the case for the importance of Egypt in 1879, similarly institutionalized 
the necessity of maintaining the empire for the protection of India.  Both of these developments, 
steeped in imperialist racial and cultural attitudes and geopolitics, had roots in and were 
precipitated by the financial management of Egypt.  The occupation of Egypt is therefore not 
only an example of gentlemanly capitalism at work, it also demonstrates how gentlemanly 
capitalism served as the catalyst and as an enduring factor of broader and more complex 
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